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The choice between rights-preserving issue methods:  
Regulatory and financial aspects of issuing seasoned equity in the UK. 
 
1.   Introduction. 
Seasoned equity issues of common stock have been subject to many studies since the early 
1960s. Most research has focused on the US and in particular on the way shares are issued and the 
subsequent market reaction to announcement of an issue. This study shows that theories regarding the 
choice  of  issue  method  developed  for  the  US  are  not  applicable  to  the  UK.  The  reasons  are  the 
existence of different flotation methods and underwriting practices. Whereas past literature on UK 
equity issues has focused on the share price reaction to announcement of seasoned equity issues, this 
paper attempts to explain the motivation of companies preferring one issue method over another. The 
role that financial distress and ownership structure play in this decision will be investigated using a 
sample of UK equity offerings in the 1990s. Subsequently, a more fundamental analysis is made of the 
difference in announcement reaction across issue methods. 
In the US and most other countries, the share price announcement reactions for underwritten 
issues  are  more  negative  relative  to  non-underwritten  ones.  This  implies  that  equity  issues  are 
underwritten  for  reasons  of  insurance  whenever  the  expected  take-up  is  low.  In  contrast, 
announcement reactions to non-underwritten issues compared to underwritten ones are opposite to 
what is found in other countries: non-underwritten equity issues in the UK experience a more negative 
announcement reaction compared to underwritten issues. Thus, it seems that the underwriting process 
in the UK predominantly fulfills a certification role. When an issue is not underwritten, the issuer is 
almost always in severe financial difficulties. Thus, the announcement of a non-underwritten issue 
signals that the issuer is not able to find an underwriter. 
In contrast to US shareholders, UK investors almost never waive their pre-emption rights. 
Still, the issuer faces the choice between two rights-preserving issue methods: the open offer versus 
the rights issue. With the latter method, the rights granted can be sold at a premium, but the offer price 
discount is significantly larger than that of an open offer in which rights are not transferable. Using a 
sample of British industrial firms quoted on the London Stock Exchange’s (LSE) Official List, we 
investigate whether or not issuer performance, future growth prospects, ownership structure and the 
use of the proceeds of the issue are important determinants of the choice of flotation method.  
We also examine the discount setting process of rights issues and open offers. In particular, we 
examine the role of the lead underwriter and his exposure, the attractiveness of the issue in terms of 
relative performance and growth opportunities.   
We report the following results. Underwriters reduce their exposure by setting larger offer 
price discounts in rights issues. Sponsors (arrangers) who also act as lead underwriter are susceptible 
to conflicts of interest and set larger discounts than those arrangers who are not also underwriters of 
the issue. In addition, the top three underwriters in the UK, who may have more bargaining power in 
discount negotiations of rights issues with the issuing firm, also set higher discounts. Whereas there is   Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




no relation between the discount in a rights issue and the corporate growth opportunities, a higher 
discount is set for high growth firms issuing equity by means of open offers. Thus, it seems that firms 
with high market-to-book ratios embed more uncertainty reflected in the discount than ‘value’ firms 
with lower growth ratios. 
The choice between performing a rights issue or an open offer depends mainly on the interests 
of directors, future growth opportunities, stock market uncertainty and the liquidity in the market for 
rights. A large required investment by insiders, large market volatility and an illiquid market for rights 
induce companies to issue shares by means of an open offer. Good corporate growth perspectives 
make a firm opt for a open offer whereas firms with low book-to-market ratios opt for a rights offer 
especially when directors or institutions own substantial share stakes. 
Finally,  we  find  that  underwritten  rights  issuers  experience  a  significantly  negative 
announcement abnormal of –2.3% whereas the market reacts positively (2.8%) to the announcement of 
an underwritten open offer. Higher pre-issue levels of director ownership and ownership concentration 
combined with a decrease in both of these levels, the use of the proceeds for acquisitions or debt 
reduction, and better growth opportunities explain most of the positive share price reaction to open 
offers. Rights issues’ announcement effect is more negative when the firm is in financial distress, 
when large discounts are made (which signal bad short-term share price performance) and when there 
are fewer growth opportunities. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief summary of the various 
methods to issue shares that are available to companies listed on the LSE. An overview of the past 
literature on seasoned equity issues and of the institutional differences between issue methods in the 
US and the UK is given in section 3. Section 4 describes the sample selection procedure and presents 
descriptive  statistics.  In  section  5,  the  estimation  method  of  announcement  returns,  as  well  as  a 
description of average market reactions to the different issue methods are presented. Section 6 contains 
cross-sectional analyses of the decision to underwrite, the level of issue price discount, and the choice 
of issue method. Section 7 continues with a cross-sectional analysis of the announcement reaction to 
equity issues and section 8 concludes. 
   
2.   (Auto-)Regulatory aspects of alternative flotation methods of UK seasoned equity offerings.  
UK  firms  performing  a  seasoned  equity  issue  of  common  stock  can  choose  from  three 
floatation methods: placing, rights issue or open offer. Rights issues and open offers are equity issues 
to the current shareholders (and subsequently to the public or to institutions, when shareholders do not 
take up any or part of the seasoned equity), whereas placings are issues to specific persons or clients of 
the sponsor or broker
1. While in rights issues and open offers preemption rights are granted to the 
current  shareholders  in  proportion  to  their  holdings,  no  such  entitlements  exist  in  placings.  Pre-
                                                           
 
1 A placing is distinctly different from a ‘private placing’: the former refers to an issue of common stock of a 
listed firm whereas the latter refers to an issue of common unlisted stock.    Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




emption rights are a prime mechanism to protect shareholders’ wealth and control and are enshrined in 
European Community law through the Second Council Directive on Company Law of 1976, and in 
UK Company Law through the Companies Act 1985 section 89(1).  
 
2.1 Placings. 
A placing is a fixed-price offering in which an underwriter purchases new shares and sells 
them on to outside investors (primarily, institutions).
 Placings are only performed for small equity 
issues  inducing  only  limited  dilution  of  shareholder  control. The Listing Rules issued by the UK 
Listing Authority (UKLA, 2000) state that placings are only allowed for equity issues of at most 5% of 
the outstanding share capital unless this restriction is waived by the shareholders in an Extraordinary 
General Meeting (EGM) with a supermajority of 75% of the votes. As shareholders almost never 
waive these rights, virtually all large stock issues are performed by way of rights issue or open offer. A 
second restriction limits the price discount of the newly issued shares to 10% of the middle market 
price at the time of the placing, unless the issuer is in severe financial difficulties or there are other 
exceptional  circumstances  (approved  by  the  UKLA).  The  UKLA  regulation  is  that  of the official 
listing  rules  of  the  London  Stock  Exchange;  non-complying  companies  are  subject  to  fines.  The 
UKLA regulation is rendered more strict by the Investor Protection Committees of the Association of 
British Insurers and the National Association of Pension Funds. These limit the size of placings not 
only to 5% of the existing share capital in any one year but also require that a series of placings be 
limited  to 7.5% of outstanding capital in a rolling three-year period. Furthermore, the issue price 
discount should not exceed 5%. Even though these guidelines do not have any legal force, their moral 




In a rights issue, the existing shareholders can exercise preemption rights to purchase further 
securities in proportion to their holdings at an exercise price set at a discount to the pre-announcement 
share price. The preemption rights are represented by a renounceable letter or provisional allotment 
letter  and  need  to  be  exercised  within  a  period  of  21  days  subsequent  to  the  announcement.
3 
Alternatively, if existing shareholders do not wish to maintain their proportional equity stake, they can 
trade the provisional allotment letter (as ‘nil paid’ rights) during this period. The rights that are neither 
traded  nor exercised  within the three-week period,  are sold  in  the  market by the broker with the 
proceeds distributed to the shareholders.
4  Entitlements that are renounced before the offering (so-
called  pre-renunciations)  are  usually  placed  with  an  underwriter  or  directly  with  institutional 
                                                           
2 Prior to 1986, the only flotation method of seasoned equity was the rights issue. 
3 The offer must be open for at least 21 days. However, if an EGM is necessary to approve the issue a notice 
period of 14 days must precede the offer period (21 days if a special resolution is proposed, which is usually the 
case). 
4 If the proceeds for an existing holder do not exceed £3.00, they may be retained for the company’s benefit.   Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




investors, and are  called placed firm.
5  Placing  rights firm is only allowed if the rights concerned 
represent at least 25% of the total amount of shares offered (unless the UKLA is convinced that a 
refusal to place a smaller fraction firm would be detrimental to the success of the issue). Furthermore, 
the price paid must not exceed one-half of the difference between the offer price and the theoretical 
ex-rights  price.  A  rights  offer  can  be  insured  or  uninsured;  in  the  former  case  the  underwriter 
guarantees in a standby agreement that all shares will be sold at the offer price. In the UK, the rights 
issue announcement includes all the offer terms whereas the offer terms in the US are only finalized 
just prior to the subscription period.  
 
2.3 Open offers. 
Similar to a rights issue, an open offer is an invitation to current shareholders to purchase new 
shares in proportion to their holdings. Still, an open offer is not made by means of a renounceable 
letter (or any other negotiable document). This implies that existing holders who opt not to take up 
their allotments, will not be able to sell their entitlements in the market. An open offer is usually made 
in conjunction with other issue methods, almost always a conditional placing. Under this procedure, 
shares are placed with an underwriter (or directly with institutions or other investors) subject to recall 
for 21 days by shareholders that take up their pro-rata entitlements. This is also called a placing with 
clawback. These types of placings are not subject to the size rules for placings mentioned previously. 
Pre-renunciations  are  generally  dealt  with  the  same  way  as  in  rights  offerings,  except  that  the 
requirement of placing at least 25% of the issue does not have to be satisfied. As in a placing, the open 
offer subscription price should not be discounted by more than 10% of the middle market price at the 
time of announcing the terms, except in exceptional circumstances.  
The vast majority of rights issues and open offers in the UK is underwritten (insured). Over 
the  periods  1959-63  (Merrett  et  al.,  1967)  and  1986-94  (Slovin  et  al.,  2000),  70%  and  91%, 
respectively, were underwritten. This is confirmed by Armitage (1999) who reports that 91% of rights 
issues and 81% of open offers were underwritten in 1985-96.  
 
3.  Why do US shareholders more frequently waive the preemption rights privilege than in the 
UK?  
  3.1 Choice of issue method. 
Preemption rights in rights issues and open offers are almost never waived by shareholders in 
the UK unless the equity issue is small. In contrast, shareholders of US firms frequently vote away the 
preemption privilege. ‘Some financial economists are puzzled that so few firms use rights offerings 
since the direct costs of a rights issue is substantially less than the direct cost of an underwritten 
offering’ (Grinblatt and Titman 1998: 17). There seems to be no valid theoretical reasons or cost 
                                                           
5 When share are ‘placed firm’, the broker calls up institutions and places the shares with the highest bidder. In 
the (unlikely) event that no institutions are interested in buying shares, the underwriter will take up the remaining 
shares (if underwritten) or the shares remain unsold (if not underwritten).   Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




reasons why general cash offers ought to be preferred over rights issues (Hansen and Pinkerton 1982, 
1984). ‘The arguments that firms make for avoiding rights issues don’t make sense. We do not know 
why [US firms] use cash offers. Perhaps there are hidden reasons, but until they are uncovered we 
don’t think you should rule out rights issues’ (Brealey and Myers 1996: 405). A second difference 
between the UK and US floatation methods is that most UK rights issues are insured, whereas those in 
the US are frequently not underwritten (uninsured). For example, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) find 1057 
firm-commitments offering over 1963-81 and 192 rights issues, of which 57 are non-underwritten.  
Agency  costs  and signaling  are  put forward to explain the choice of issue method. Smith 
(1977) believes that agency costs can explain the widespread use of underwritten offerings in the US 
instead of the significantly cheaper (uninsured) rights offerings. He suggests that, first, managers may 
enjoy private benefits when underwriters attempt to ‘bribe’ them with ‘wining and dining’. Second, 
the  fact  that  investment  bankers  serve  on  corporate  boards  may  facilitate  lobbing  for  using  that 
investment bank as managing underwriter. Third, a manager can set the offer price low so as to create 
oversubscription,  which  allows  him  to  implement  a  rationing  scheme.  In  such  a  scheme,  specific 
classes  of  shareholders  -like  small  shareholders  or  key  personnel-  can  be  favored  such  that  large 
shareholder monitoring is reduced. Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) state that asymmetric information 
about  firm  quality  explains  the  choice  of  flotation  method.  Low  quality  firms  opt  for  a  firm 
commitment offering, thus triggering the largest negative share price reactions. The highest quality 
firms chose an insured rights offering because underwriter certification provides them with a quality 
seal.  Lower  quality  firms  opt  for  an  uninsured  rights  issue  and  use  the  subscription  price  to 
differentiate quality. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) reach different conclusions using an adverse selection 
framework. In a rights issue, the wealth transfer from old to new shareholders is lower, the more 
shares  existing  shareholders  take  up.  When  all  shares  are  expected  to  be  taken  up  by  existing 
shareholders, there is no expected wealth transfer and the company will employ the cheapest issue 
method, namely an uninsured rights offering. As the expected take-up falls, firms issue by means of an 
underwritten rights offer if the certification benefit of an underwriter outweighs underwriting costs. As 
the take-up falls even further, the underwriter fee in a rights issue may approach the firm-commitment 
fee of an underwritten offering such that the firm opts for the latter to avoid additional costs associated 
with  the  distribution  of  rights.  Bøhren  et  al.  (1997)  find  supporting  evidence  for  the  Eckbo  and 
Masulis-theory for Norway.  
As  preemption  rights  are  only  rarely  waived  in  the  UK  and  as  almost  all  offers  are 
underwritten, the above theories cannot be readily transposed to the UK. Also, the existence of open 
offers and their announcement reactions cannot be explained by these theories. We investigate the 
decision in the UK to use a particular issue method, to set the discount and to underwrite in section 6.  
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3.2 International evidence. 
Most empirical research on seasoned equity offerings focuses on the announcement effects of 
different types of flotation methods. It should be noted in many European countries public issues are 
not  common  or  do  not  even  exist.  Table  1  summarizes  the  two-day  market  adjusted  returns  for 
different countries. The share price reacts negatively to equity issues in the UK, US, New Zealand, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. Public issues trigger significantly negative share price reactions whereas 
private offers of seasoned equity originate mildly positive abnormal returns. Underwriting of rights 
issues occurs when the expected take-up by current shareholders is low, which emits a bad signal 
about firm quality. This explains why the announcement reaction to underwritten rights issues is more 
negative  than  to  non-underwritten  rights  issues  (see  US,  Norway,  New  Zealand).  This  relation  is 
reversed for the UK where only low quality firms are not able to obtain an underwritten issue contract 
(see section 6.1).  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Positive announcement reactions to equity issues are recorded for Finland, Greece, Japan and 
Korea. The disparity in announcement effects between countries has several causes. First, different 
types of firms may be listed. For example, Korean firms tend to be more closely held in comparison to 
e.g. US companies. Second, institutions and the size of capital markets differ across countries. Small 
capital markets such as Finland, Greece, Korea, New Zealand and Sweden tend to be less liquid and 
price elasticities of financial assets are smaller. Third, not all types of flotation methods can be used in 
each country. For instance, in Norway and New Zealand the only available method is the rights issue. 
In  Finland,  Greece,  Sweden  and  Switzerland,  offers  to  the  public  are  rare  and  rights  issues  are 
performed  by  convention.  Fourth,  other  tax  and  regulatory  differences  across  countries  may  be 
responsible for the disparities shown in Table 1. For example, shares purchased through an equity 
issue in Finland are subject to favorable tax treatment and there are lax financial reporting guidelines 
regarding firm value reappraisal in Greece. In Switzerland there are no legal restrictions on insider 
trading so that information asymmetries between management and investors may be relatively short-
lived.  
 
4.   Sample Selection, Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics. 
   
  4.1 Sample Selection. 
A sample consisting of all (1463) seasoned equity issues (‘further issues’) was collected for 
the period 1992 and 1999. The data on these issues were recorded from several data sources: the 
Perfect Information (PI) database, which contains scanned copies of issue prospectuses, Sequencer   Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




news announcements and Regulatory News Service
6 (RNS) messages in Reuters Business Briefing. To 
retain an uncontaminated sample of equity issue announcements, we subsequently reduced the number 
of issues using the following criteria:  
·  First,  issues  by  financial  firms  such  as  banks,  pension  funds,  insurance  and  investment 
companies, were excluded as financial reporting, structure and management of these types of 
firms is very different from industrial companies.  
·  Second, AIM-quoted companies
7 were excluded because listing and reporting requirements on 
this exchange differ from those on the Official List of the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  
·  Third, stock issues that do not raise additional funds (e.g. bonus issues, scrip issues, conversion 
of warrants or options) or that may generate mixed effects (combined/international issues) were 
also eliminated from the sample.  
·  Fourth,  issues  that  were  accompanied  by  major  corporate  announcements,  such  as 
announcements of earnings or named acquisitions, or a change of listing (e.g. from the AIM to 
the Official List) were excluded as the pure effect of the issue as reflected in the abnormal 
returns cannot be investigated. A similar method is used in Kalay and Shimrat (1987) for US 
issues.  
·  Fifth, a further 162 offerings (mainly placings) are eliminated because lack of data availability 
on  issue  characteristics  (method,  offer  price,  size  of  issue,  etc  for  114  cases),  ownership 
structure (45 cases), accounting data (1 case) and daily share prices (2 cases).  
 
The final uncontaminated sample includes 95 issues, distributed over years and issue methods 
as shown in Table 2. Due to the creation of a sample of ‘clean’ announcements, relatively few issues 
are recorded compared to earlier research on UK share issues but the distributions over issue methods 
approximately  agree.
8  This choice  to  use an ‘uncontaminated’ sample selection method may have 
introduced certain biases, notably towards older and larger companies (as only firms on the Official 
List were considered) and possibly towards poorly performing companies
9.  
[insert Table 2 about here] 
                                                           
6 The Regulatory News Service is the official news service of the LSE. All quoted companies are required to 
publish price-sensitive information on the RNS so that it is available to the whole of the market at the same time. 
7 The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) exists since 1995 and is the LSE’s public market for small, young 
and growing companies. It frequently serves as a ‘stepping stone’ to the Official List. Prior to 1995, the Unlisted 
Securities Market (USM) fulfilled a similar role. The AIM is managed separately from the LSE’s other markets 
and has its own rules and regulations. For example, there is a Model Code for AIM companies that imposes 
restrictions, beyond those required by law, on the freedom of directors and employees to deal in their companies’ 
shares in certain circumstances such as the announcement of annual results. AIM companies are young, small 
and have more uncertain future prospects. Large investors in these companies are therefore expected to be more 
closely related to the company and to possess more inside information.  
8 For the overlapping sample period 1992-94, Slovin et al. (2000) find 161 rights issues and 57 placings (a ratio 
of 2.8 rights issues to each placing), whereas our sample has a ratio of 2.5 to 1. Our ratio of the number of rights 
issues to open offers (2.8 to one) is similar to the one in Armitage (2000) (2.1 to one in 1985-96). 
9 This argument is based on the assumption that many companies that are doing well issue equity to perform a 
specific acquisition. Since these issues are excluded from the sample, it may become biased towards more poorly 
performing companies that are in need of working capital or debt-reduction.   Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    





Data on ownership structure is collected from the Worldscope database, supplemented by data 
from  prospectuses  (PI),  Sequencer  and  the  Regulatory  News  Service,  in  which  all  dealings  by 
shareholders owning 3% or more of outstanding shares are announced. Director shareholdings, all of 
which have to be reported even if they fall below the mandatory disclosure threshold of 3%, are 
gathered from Sequencer, RNS and prospectuses. Compustat, Datastream, Extel Cards (in Sequencer) 
and the London Share Price Database (LSPD) were used to collect daily share price and accounting 
data.  
 
  4.2 Descriptive Issue Statistics. 
Table 3 reports accounting and issue-specific statistics with a sample breakdown according to 
issue method. As expected, placings are much smaller than rights issues and open offers due to the 
restrictions on placing size (see section 2). Only three placings are found larger than 5% of the issuer’s 
outstanding share capital
10, whereas none of the rights issues or open offers were smaller than 5%. 
Rights issues and open offers raise 30.4% and 25.6% of additional share capital. As most rights issues 
and  open  offers  in  the  UK  are  underwritten  –only  4  open  offers  and  1  rights  issue  are  non-
underwritten– Table 3 only reports data for underwritten rights issues and open offers.  
[insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Discounts to the market price are small for open offers and placings (on average 3.8% and 
2.9%, respectively) in comparison to the discount given on rights issues (on average 16.0%)
11. This is 
in line with the restriction that the discount in open offers and placings cannot exceed 10%. The 
subscription price on non-underwritten issues varies from a premium to the market price of 13.3% to a 
discount of 58.6%. The two open offers in this sample with discounts over 10% (allowed only for 
financially distressed firms) are non-underwritten. The single non-underwritten rights issue took place 
at  a  deep  discount  of  58.6%.  Table  3  also  exhibits  that  companies  performing  rights  issues  are 
substantially larger than those opting for open offers. In fact, in the largest size quintile in terms of 
market value, all but one issue are rights issues, whereas the lowest quintile contains an equal number 
of open offers and rights issues. Firm performance, measured by (industry-adjusted) return on assets 
(ROA),  is  not  statistically  different  between  underwritten  rights  issues  and  open offers.  A higher 
market-to-book (and price-earnings) ratio of open offer firms combined with a lower dividend payout 
                                                           
10 Surprisingly, Slovin et al. (2000), for a sample of UK equity issues between 1986 and 1994, find an average 
(median) placing size of 70% (30%) of market value. It seems that open offers are also included in their placing 
sample. Such shares are only conditionally placed but are subject to a clawback clause. 
11 The discount on underwritten rights issues is similar to the average of 17.0% (median 15.9%) found by Slovin 
et al. (2000). Armitage (1999) finds an average discount to market price for open offers of 13.0%, which is 
peculiar considering the limited ability of companies to perform an open offer with a discount over 10%. The 
median discount of 7.8% is more in line with the median of 4.2% found for all open offers (underwritten and 
non-underwritten) in this sample. For rights issues, Armitage also finds an average (median) discount of 21.0% 
(17.6%) comparable to an average discount of our sample rights issues of 17.1% (median 15.8%).   Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




ratio suggests that these firms have more growth opportunities than firms performing rights issues. 
Table 3 also shows that relatively few open offers are used to reduce leverage. Firms conducting an 
open offer appear to be more often in need of working capital. 
Underwritten  rights  issues  seem  to  enjoy  a  larger  take-up  by  current  shareholders  than 
underwritten open offers, 77.0% versus 46.7% (see Table 3). Still, the main reason is that rights that 
are sold in the marketplace by current shareholders and taken up by others are also recorded as ‘taken 
up’. In contrast, open offer entitlements cannot be traded such that all renounced entitlements are 
considered as not taken up. Of the underwritten issues, 24% of all rights issues and 7% of open offers 
employ the services of one of the three major UK underwriters for their offering year. The three most 
frequently contracted underwriters
12 offer their services to 268 out of 1,078 issues (24.9%) over 1992-
1999, compared to 19.2% for this sample. In around 80% of all underwritten issues, the sponsor (or 
arranger) to the issue is also the lead underwriter.  
Of  the  5  non-underwritten  issues,  4  are  in  the  smallest  size  quintile.  Furthermore,  firms 
performing non-underwritten offerings have a substantially lower industry-adjusted ROA compared to 
underwritten issues. Market-to-book and P/E ratios of firms with non-underwritten issues average 1.68 
and –28.37, respectively (with medians 1.49 and –30.93). Moreover, they have high leverage with an 
average of 234% (145% median) in book value terms and 177% (149% median) in market values. 
This suggests that companies performing non-underwritten offerings are small, poorly performing and 
possibly financially distressed firms without good future prospects. The one non-underwritten rights 
issue in the sample had a take-up of 81.9% whereas the four non-underwritten open offers experienced 
a 37.4% average take-up (median 21.1%).  
 
  4.3 Measurement of Performance and Financial Distress. 
As  seasoned  equity  issues  may  be  important  in  the  financial  restructuring  of  financial 
distressed firms, we collected information on bankruptcy, liquidations and listing suspensions of the 
issuer  from  the  LSPD.  In  addition,  firm  performance  (ROA  excluding  extraordinary  items)  and 
leverage (in book value), is compared to the ROA and leverage deciles of the constituents of the FTSE 
All-Share Index for the year of issue (see Table 4). We consider the following firms to be in financial 
distress: the issuer (i) is in the lowest ROA decile, (ii) is in the highest leverage decile, (iii) has an 
interest  cover  (EBITDA  divided  by  total  interest  expense)  below  two
13,  (iv)  had  two  or  more 
subsequent dividend cuts within a period of up to two years before and after the offering,
14 (v) had a 
listing suspension within a time frame of two years around the offering period, (vi) was taken over by 
another party within two years after the offering period due to poor performance, or (vii) entered 
                                                           
12 Underwriter names were collected from Thomson’s SDC Platinum database and were ranked according to the 
number of rights issues and open offers underwritten. Since SDC Platinum is not complete prior to 1994, the 
Extel Financial ‘Professional Advisers to New Issues’ was used for 1992 and 1993.  
13 All but two sample firms with an interest cover below two comply to the ROA and leverage distress measures. 
14 As noted by Marsh (1992), UK companies are reluctant to cut dividends as the market tends to interpret such 
cuts as powerful signals of bad news.   Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




administrative  receivership  or  was  liquidated  within  two  years  after  the  offering  period.  Table  4 
confirms that the reason why some rights issues and open offers are not underwritten is financial 
distress. This confirms that the underwriting process fulfills a certification role.  
[insert Table 4 about here] 
   
  4.4 Ownership Structure. 
To gain some insight into the ownership structure of issuers and changes therein resulting 
from the equity issue, we report aggregate ownership concentration by type of large shareholder in 
Table 5. The Herfindahl index of the 5 largest shareholders shows that –prior to the issue- the share 
concentration of firms with underwritten open offers is higher than that of firms with rights issues. 
Furthermore, open offers lead to a considerably higher fall in ownership concentration after the issue 
as large current shareholders take up less of their entitlements in open offers than in rights issues. As 
expected, placings do not have a large impact on ownership concentration. 
[insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The aggregate holdings of institutions owning at least 3% is somewhat higher in firms with 
underwritten open offers. Institutions usually take up their entitlements and some purchase those new 
shares not taken up by others, resulting in a zero median (and positive average) change in institutional 
holdings. In companies performing non-underwritten offers,  institutions  own lower average stakes 
15.1% compared to the overall average of 26.2%. Insider ownership (the aggregate of holdings of 
CEO, chairman, executive and non-executive directors) is higher for underwritten open offers. The 
fact that all six underwritten issues in which insiders do not own any shares are rights issues, suggests 
that the impact of issue method on directors’ personal wealth may play an important role in the choice 
of  issue  method  (see  section  6.2).  Open  offers  lead  to  stronger  decreases  in  the  aggregate  share 
concentration of directors whereas in rights issues directors exercise more of their entitlements. In 
some 30% of issues, insiders pre-renounce (part of) their entitlements, resulting in a decline in their 
ownership levels.
15 Directors hardly ever participate in placings and consequently their stake in the 
company  is  slightly  diluted  after  a  placing.  The  sum  of  large  shareholdings  by  corporations  and 
individuals or families (not related to a director) is lower for companies with open offers. Individuals 
possess shares in only 22% of all issues (11% of open offers and 18% of rights issues). In those rights 
issues in which insiders own shares their stake declines by 14.1% whereas the average decline for 
open offers with insider stakes is only 5.0%.  
To summarize section 4, placings are employed for small share issues such that only modest 
effects on ownership concentration and structure are observed. Issuers of open offers are smaller on 
average  but  have  better  growth  opportunities  as  reflected  in  higher  market-to-book  values,  price-
                                                           
15  In  non-underwritten  issues,  directors’  ownership  levels  decline  substantially  more  than  in  underwritten 
offerings: an average decline of –13.1% (median –8.7%) for the CEO’s stake, -9.4% (0%) for the chairman, and 
-28.0% (-32.4%) for other executive directors.    Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




earnings ratios, lower dividend payout ratios and the fact that the proceeds of a seasoned equity issue 
are  used  more  frequently  for  investment  purposes  rather  than  for  debt  reduction.  The  financial 
performance of firms with open offers does not differ from firms performing rights issues, but the 
former are more frequently in need of working capital. Firms employing rights issues more frequently 
need leverage reduction. Furthermore, issuers of underwritten open offers are usually more closely- 
held than companies performing underwritten rights issues and have higher institutional and insider 
ownership. Ownership concentration and insider holdings decline more strongly in open offers, but 
share  stakes  held  by  individuals  and  families  decline  less.  Non-underwritten  issues  seem  to  be 
performed at high discounts by ill-performing, highly leveraged companies with low market value.  
 
5.   Methodology and Announcement Reactions 
This  section  discusses  the  market’s  reaction  to  the  announcement  of  different  types  of 
seasoned equity offerings. To calculate abnormal returns (ARs), the standard market model is applied 
to continuously compounded daily data. The trade-to-trade method as in Dimson (1979) is used to 
correct for non-synchronous trading. To control for possible heteroscedasticity, a weighting scheme is 
introduced in which all parameters are divided by the square root of the time Dt between trades, so that 
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where Rit and Rmt are net returns of the stock i and the market at time t, ai is interpreted as a constant 
daily return on stock i and bi is the sensitivity of stock returns to general returns in the market. The 
market index is the FTSE All-Share index, a market-value weighted arithmetic index representing 
virtually the whole market capitalization of the LSE
16. The estimation period is set from 180 to 31 
trading days before the announcement of the issue (day 0). The event window ranges from trading 
days –20 to +10.  
[insert Table 6 about here] 
 
ARs  of  all  issues  are  reported  by  sub-sample  in  Table  6.  Underwritten  rights  issuers 
experience a significantly negative announcement AR of –1.9%. The two-day cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) amounts to a significant –2.3%, in line with the results of Slovin et al. (2000) who find –
2.6%. Armitage (1999) reports a negative return of –3.0% on a sample of all rights issues which is 
close to our result of –2.9% for the merged sample of underwritten and non-underwritten rights issues.  
                                                           
16 Until 1992, the FTSE All-Share Index consisted of about 650 stocks representing over 90% of the total market 
value of the stocks traded on the LSE. From January 4, 1993 coverage was extended to include around 800 
companies representing 98% of total market value. By 1995 the number of constituents had risen to about 920 
covering 98.2% of market capitalization.    Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




For underwritten open offers the announcement abnormal return is significantly positive at 
2.8%. Furthermore, the CAR over days –20 to –2 is also significant at the 5% level. This suggests that 
there is anticipation or information leakage to the market prior to an equity offering. There are no 
previous studies that examine the share price reaction to underwritten open offers in particular, but 
Armitage (1999) reports a significant two-day announcement return of 1.03% on a sample of all open 
offers. This result compares to an insignificant return of –0.30% for all open offers (underwritten and 
non-underwritten) in our sample.
17  
Placings experience a positive, yet statistically insignificant, two-day CAR of +1.0%, in line 
with the +1.2% in Slovin et al. (2000). Even though there do not seem to be any firmly significant 
ARs, the (significant) CAR over the whole event period is 9.96% due to the stock price run-up. One 
possible explanation for the lack of a significant announcement reaction is the small placing size, the 
fact that the proceeds are not crucial to the company and that such an issue is private in character. As 
the placing does not evoke a significant market reaction and share price continues to rise, the market 
does not seem to infer that the company is overvalued. Management has considerable flexibility to 
time the issue (especially compared to rights issues and open offers) as 71% (significant at the 1% 
level) is performed after a positive share price run-up over trading days –20 to –2.  
The theories explaining the difference in announcement reactions across issue methods in the 
US (see section 3) do not explain the difference in share price reactions to UK offering methods. The 
adverse selection model of Eckbo and Masulis (1992) predicts that undervalued firms will have the 
highest  participation rate, will choose uninsured rights issues and will experience a positive price 
reaction. In addition, (low quality) firms with an anticipated low participation rate will chose a firm 
commitment contract, which in itself signals low quality and triggers negative price reactions. Both 
predictions are not sustained for the UK: non-underwritten offers are mostly performed by financially 
distressed firms and hence induce a large negative price reaction. A US firm commitment offer, which 
comes closest to the open offers, does not trigger a negative price reaction but a significantly positive 
one in the UK. The signaling model of Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) assumes that the highest-quality 
firms undertake an underwritten rights issue, medium quality firms opt for an uninsured rights offer 
and the lowest quality firms perform a firm commitment offer. Judging from the average negative 
announcement reaction to rights issues and the positive one to open offers, the signaling model’s 
predictions are not sustained by the UK findings. We analyse the reasons for the negative reactions to 
a rights issue and the positive ones to open offers further in section 7. 
                                                           
17 Most notably, one firm experienced a –41.4% AR on announcement of its non-underwritten open offer, while 
the single non-underwritten rights issue suffered a –24.8% ‘impact day’ return. The market thus received these 
highly discounted issues (at 33% and 59% respectively) by severely distressed companies very badly. Two-day 
and three-day ARs on non-underwritten rights issues and open offers are –13.0% and –9.6%, on average. It 
appears that most non-underwritten equity issues experience negative price reactions, but there is a large cross-
sectional variance in ARs. For some poorly performing firms, the announcement of an equity issue may either 
signal a refinancing effort and possible salvation for the company or merely a wealth transfer from shareholders 
to bondholders (Galai and Masulis, 1976). Wealth transfers from shareholders to bondholders are larger in more 
distressed firms.   Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




6.   The Choice of Issue Method. 
When a UK listed company intends to collect a large amount of equity capital, a placing is 
ruled out as shareholders’ pre-emption rights need to be honored. Issuers’ choice is thus limited to a 
rights issue or an open offer. In this section, we study the choice of issue method, the setting of the 
subscription price (at a discount to the market price) as well as whether or not the issue should be 
underwritten. Special attention is paid to situations of financial distress, strong growth opportunities 
and insider ownership concentration of the issuer.  
 
6.1   To Underwrite or Not to Underwrite: the Question. 
Once a decision to procure new funds from the stock market has been made, the company 
appoints an ‘arranger’ or ‘sponsor’, and a broker. Usually the company selects the merchant bank and 
broker with which it has a long-standing relation. As sponsor, the merchant bank receives an advisory 
fee for its advice on the amount that can be raised, the timing and structure of the issue, and for its 
help with the organization of the issue. If the issue is to be underwritten, it will usually act as lead 
underwriter. The broker advises on how to market the issue to the investment community including 
probing institutions’ interest to act as sub-underwriters. The underwriting agreement is signed between 
the issuing company and the lead underwriter on the evening before public announcement day (also 
known as the ‘impact day’) of the offering. In the event that the offer (be it a rights issue or open offer) 
is under-subscribed, the underwriter is required to purchase all unsold shares at the issue price. The 
lead underwriter limits his risk by inviting sub-underwriters (through the broker) to purchase shares 
from  him  in  case  of  under-subscription.  Such  agreements  are  typically  signed  the  day  following 
impact day by the financial institutions of the City (insurance companies, pension funds and unit 
trusts).  
According to the LSE’s listing rules, price-sensitive information is to be released to all parties 
in  the  market  simultaneously.  This  means  that  the institutional  investment  community  should not 
formally know about the issue until the day of announcement. As a consequence, the lead underwriter 
and  broker  generally  have  to  arrange  all  of  the  sub-underwriting  more  or  less  simultaneously  on 
impact day. As there may be as many as 200-300 sub-underwriters for an issue, it does not seem 
uncommon for major institutions to be contacted beforehand. There is even some evidence that some 
of the sub-underwriting is informally arranged shortly before announcement, especially for difficult 
issues or for those issues by not so well-known companies (Director-General of Fair Trading - DGFT 
1995,  1996).  Hence,  it  seems  likely  that  any  substantial  price  movement  prior  to  announcement 
(illustrated in section 5) results from information leakage during the sub-underwriting process. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  underwriter  in  the  UK  takes  on  more  risk  than  its  US 
counterpart.  Whereas  a  US  underwriter  in  a  firm  commitment  offering  can adjust  the  issue price 
during the offer period (Parsons and Raviv 1985), a UK underwriter commits to the issue price the day 
before announcement without being able to change the price in case of adverse share price movements   Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




during  the  offer  period.  Negotiating  the  subscription  price  (at  a  sufficiently large  discount  to the 
current share price) is therefore very important, as it determines the risk that the (sub)underwriters 
assume.  The  (sub-)underwriter  risk  consists  of:  (i)  company-specific  risk  of  adverse  share  price 
movements, (ii) general market risk that all shares prices may dive and (iii) sensitivity of the firm’s 
share price to market movements. It is clear that the lead underwriter limits its own risk if it can limit 
sub-underwriters’ risk. The importance of setting an appropriate subscription price is amplified by the 
fact that the overall fee charged for underwriting is by convention fixed at 2% of the gross proceeds of 
the issue. Typically, the lead underwriter retains 0.5%, the broker receives 0.25% and 1.25% goes to 
the sub-underwriters.
18  
The incentives of the issuing company are different: it wants to conduct the issue with the least 
possible risk of failure but at the lowest possible cost. As a general rule, companies are therefore 
interested in as small a discount as possible, given a good probability of success. It may be more cost-
efficient for the issuer to avoid the cost of underwriting and conduct an issue at a deeper discount. If 
successful, the gross proceeds to the company could be similar (or higher) as with an underwritten 
issue, as the cost of underwriting
19 are saved. In practice, however, non-underwritten issues rarely 
occur, for both psychological and practical reasons (MMC 1999): (i) no matter how deeply discounted, 
the  proceeds  are  never  certain;  (ii)  the  market  may  interpret  a  deep  discount  as  a signal  of poor 
corporate prospects, (iii) conflicts of interest may arise for arrangers who act as lead underwriters. For 
non-underwritten rights issues there is the additional disadvantage of a deep discount: inefficiencies in 
the market for rights lead to wealth losses for shareholders not taking up their part of the new shares as 
they are unable to sell their rights for their full (theoretical) value and may lead to a capital gains tax 
charge on the premium of the rights sold. Both these wealth effects are, ceteris paribus, larger the 
higher the discount.
20 There are only five firms with non-underwritten rights issues in our sample, 
three of which are severely distressed small companies.
21 Most likely, they were unable to find an 
                                                           
18 Since October 1996 sub-underwriting for many larger issues has been either partially or (occasionally) wholly 
tendered, leading to some reduction in sub-underwriting fees. However, these tenders have attracted few bids 
from organizations other than the traditional sub-underwriters and standard fees were still charged by the lead 
underwriter  and  broker.  A  report  from  the  Monopolies  and  Mergers  Commission  in  February  1999  on  the 
underwriting business states that without pressure from the Commission and the Director General of Fair Trade, 
tendering for underwriting would probably remain “cautious and limited”. 
19 The cost of underwritten rights issues in the UK is about one-third less than in the US (Armitage 2000). 
Hence, the savings obtained by not underwriting an equity issue are more limited in the UK. 
20 A higher discount implies higher proceeds for selling rights, which increase the possibility of passing the 
taxation threshold of £ 3,000 or of 5%. Furthermore, higher proceeds also lead to a higher chargeable gain (see 
section 6.2), but the percentage of proceeds that is taxed remains constant.  
21 African Lakes Corporation and Regent Corporation had their listings suspended twice in the 18 months prior 
to the issue and the latter went into administrative receivership. Both companies performed non-underwritten 
open offers at discounts of more than 10% which is only allowed in case of severe financial difficulties, and they 
had take-ups by current shareholders of only 15% and 27%. The offering prospectus of African Lakes Corp. 
stated that “In the opinion of the directors, should a capital raising not be implemented, the Group would face 
serious financial difficulties. The Group is currently in default under a number of its loan agreements. In the 
absence of a capital raising, the Group would continue to be heavily indebted with no real prospect of being 
able to reduce its debt other than through the sale of its core assets.” The chairman of the board of Regent Corp. 
stated that the firm was “confronted with a serious shortage in liquidity” and that “any alternative action would 
require the disposal of assets at ‘fire-sale’ prices or a winding-down of virtually all activities”. Caverdale saw a   Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




underwriter  and  could  negotiate  at  most  a  ‘best  efforts’  contract  with  an  investment  bank. 
Underwriters may have perceived the risk of not getting the issue sub-underwritten at any discount as 
too high. Moreover, lead underwriters build up a reputation from offering good issues to their sub-
underwriters and in the small world of the underwriting business, no reputation means no business. 
Thus, it is clear that non-underwritten share issues by UK industrial companies are usually conducted 
by small, severely financially distressed companies that are not able to arrange underwriting.  
 
6.2   Rights Issue versus Open Offer. 
UK  firms  intending  to  issue  seasoned  equity  have  to  decide  upon  an  issue  method: 
(underwritten)  rights  issue  versus  (underwritten)  open  offer.  We  investigate  this  choice  from  the 
perspective of the current shareholders in cases in which (a) all newly issued shares are taken up by 
the current shareholders and (b) some shareholders decide not to subscribe, and from the perspective 
of external investors interested in buying part of the seasoned equity.  
As long as shareholders take up all their entitlements to new shares, the choice between a 
rights issue or an open offer is trivial as shareholders maintain their proportional share stake with both 
issue  methods  and  pay  the  subscription  price.  Moreover,  Armitage (2000) shows that there  is  no 
difference between the methods in terms of direct issue costs after controlling for issue size and the 
percentage underwritten.  
When  some  current  shareholders  decide  not  to  take  up  newly  issued  shares,  the  choice 
between the two flotation methods is based on the trade-off between the premium of the pre-emption 
rights and the subscription price discount (see section 4.2). For those not taking up their entitlements, 
an open offer may be attractive as the new shares can be placed prior to the offer period at a low 
discount resulting in a low dilution in their present holdings. Alternatively, the company can perform a 
rights issue at a larger discount, but shareholders receive a premium when selling their rights. The 
indifference between the two issue methods holds when the market for rights is liquid or, in case this 
market is illiquid, there is little difference in the discount between the two issue methods. However, 
even if these conditions are fulfilled in practice, taxation and transaction costs may render a rights 
issue less attractive. Let us consider these costs when current shareholders do not exercise their rights: 
the  rights  can  be  (i)  renounced  and  placed  firm  with  institutions  before  dealings  in  provisional 
allotment letters start, (ii) sold in the market, or (iii) not taken up and the shares are sold to sub-
underwriters (or to their clients) at the offer price at the end of the three-week offer period.  
In the first case (the rights are ‘placed firm’), the actual proceeds to shareholders are smaller 
than  one  would  expect  due  to  capital  gains  tax  liabilities.  A  rights  issue  is  essentially  a  capital 
reorganization and does not create a tax liability in itself, but the premium in a sale of rights is liable to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
recent change of strategy take a turn for the worse, changed its name to Actionleisure and changed broker to the 
issue  only  10  days  before  announcement,  a  sign  of  lack  of  confidence  in  the  success  of  the  issue.  The 
announcement of the need of refinancing of these companies triggered strongly negative ARs of–22%. 
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capital gains tax for individual investors or corporation tax for corporate investors. Tax is due on that 
part of premium which represents an increase in the share value since the date at which the shares 
were acquired. To clarify, consider a simple numerical example. Imagine that a firm with 100 million 
shares outstanding performs a 1-for-2 rights issue at 108p per share, a discount of 10% to the current 
market price of 120p. The value of one right then equals 4p. An individual investor owning 1% of the 
firm (1 million shares) decides to sell his entitlements for a total amount of £40,000. If the investor 
bought the 1m shares at 100p, the (unrealized) capital gain is £ 200,000. At the sale of the rights, the 
capital gain is split: part of it remains unrealized in the share value whereas the other part is realized 
through the proceeds of the rights sale. On this realized gain taxes are paid. In this example, as the ex-
rights price is 116p and the rights are worth 4p, the £ 200,000 capital gain is split in £ 160,000 (share 
value) and £ 40,000 (proceeds of rights). The chargeable gain is computed as the proceeds to the sale 
of the rights minus the share of base cost allocated to these rights and transaction costs, multiplied by a 
taper
22. The base cost refers to the original purchase price of the shares. The proportion allocated to the 
rights is the ratio of the value of the rights to the share capital and the realized gains after issue: 
Share of Base Cost =  Base Cost × 
Proceeds of Sale
Current Value of Shares + Proceeds of Sale   
(the denominator is equal to the value of the share capital before the equity issue). 
In our numerical example, the share of base cost equals 1m x [40k / (1.16m + 40k)] = £ 33,333. The 
chargeable gain is thus 40,000-33,333 = £ 6,667.
  23 At a capital gains tax rate of e.g. 25%, this tax 
amounts to £ 1,667 or 4.2%. In summary, 
 
Original purchase price per share (pence):      100 
Current value of a shares before issue (pence):     120 
Subscription price (pence):         108 
Number of new shares for 1 old share:        0.5 
Number of shares owned:         1,000,000 
Ex-rights price (pence):         116 
Theoretical price of 1 right (pence):           4      
 
Proceeds of sale (£):           40,000 
Share of base cost allocated (£):       - 33,333 
Chargeable gain (£):           = 6,667 
                          (in %):          16.67% 
Tax (£, suppose 25% rate):         1,667 
          (in %):          4.17 % 
 
                                                           
22 The taper reduces chargeable gains by correcting for the length of time that an asset has been held. For non-
business assets, which shareholdings usually are, only 60% of a capital gain is chargeable after a holding period 
of ten years. Where shares have been acquired before April 1998, indexation is applicable for periods up to that 
month. For simplicity, taper relief and indexation is ignored in this example. 
23 If the proceeds to the sale are smaller than 3,000 pounds or 5% of the value of the underlying shares at the 
time  of  issue  (whichever  is  greater),  the  chargeable  gain  may  be  shifted  to  the  year  in  which  the  shares 
underlying the rights are sold.    Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




Ceteris paribus, a higher discount and a larger proportion of entitlements sold lead to a higher 
chargeable gain. In percentage terms, the only factor influencing the chargeable gain is the difference 
between original purchase cost and current value of the shares (i.e. the total unrealized capital gain).  
In the second case (when rights are sold in the market), the burden of the tax liability is 
exacerbated  by  transaction  costs.  A  Credit  Suisse  First  Boston  study  appended  to  MMC  (1999) 
concludes that the sales price of rights is frequently substantially below the theoretical price, especially 
for very illiquid shares or in the presence of a large supply of entitlements.  
In  the  third  case  (the  rights  are  not  sold  in  the  market  and  expire  valueless),  the  broker 
attempts to place the rump (unsold shares) at a premium at the end of the offer period. This may lead 
to a gain, but is subject to the same transaction costs and taxes as a sale of rights. If no premium can be 
obtained,  the  shares  are  placed  with  sub-underwriters  at  the  subscription  price  and  shareholders 
receive no compensation.  
For non-shareholders interested in purchasing shares in a seasoned equity issue, an open offer 
may  be  more  attractive  because  there  is  a  higher  probability  that  shares  can  be  purchased  at  the 
subscription price. A rights issue does not facilitate the marketing of shares to non-shareholders as the 
issuing company has no stock to offer directly (except through the pre-placement of entitlements of 
major  shareholders  subject  to  the  rules  mentioned  above).  Thus,  non-shareholders  either  have  to 
purchase rights from existing shareholders in the market (in which case they acquire shares at virtually 
the market price), buy the shares not taken up at the end of the offer period at a premium, or act as 
sub-underwriter to the issue (for which they have to be on the broker’s institutional list). In contrast, 
an  open  offer  is  more  open  to  new  outside  holders.  The  shares  are  offered  to  prospective  new 
shareholders at the subscription price at the time of announcement of the offer (together with a fee 
similar to that given to sub-underwriters in a rights issue). At the end of the offer period, these new 
shareholders can hold on to that part of the issue that is not ‘clawed back’ by the current shareholders. 
Thus,  open  offers  are  more  likely  to  be  chosen  if  there  is  a  large  number  of  long-term  external 
investors  interested  in  acquiring  seasoned  equity.  This  also  implies  that  performance  and  growth 
opportunities of the issuer may be important determinants of the issue method and the discount on the 
subscription price. 
To conclude, we expect that when many current shareholders prefer not to subscribe to the 
equity offering and when there is strong demand by institutions as longer-term investors, an open offer 
would be preferred as the tax liability and transaction costs which arise from selling the rights can be 
avoided. Also, if a rights issue would be performed, the pressure on the market for rights would be 
very  high.  In  contrast,  when  management  has  less  information  about  the  interest  of  current 
shareholders in the issue, a rights issue, which offers most flexibility to current shareholders, may be 
preferred provided there is a liquid market for rights. If the market in rights is liquid and there is strong 
demand, the rights premium will offset the larger dilution in share value in a rights issue compared to 
an open offer.    Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    





6.3   The Discount-setting Process: the Underwriters’ Perspective. 
   (Sub)underwriters face more uncertainty in a rights issue than in an open offer as in the latter 
it is easier to get an estimate of the take-up by current shareholders. As the underwriters in a rights 
issue are mostly fulfilling a certifying role, they are also more sensitive to the riskiness of the issue 
and the market. Therefore, in rights issues we expect a) larger discounts and b) a positive relation 
between discounts and risk factors. Conflicts of interest may also influence the discount because the 
merchant bank appointed as the arranger (sponsor) is frequently the lead underwriter. In previous 
section,  we  argued  that  when  corporate  growth  opportunities  and  performance  are  high,  a  large 
number of long-term external investors may be attracted such that open offers are more likely to be 
chosen and the discount is smaller.  
In Table 7, the factors proxying for risk, performance, growth and type of underwriter are 
regressed  on  the  subscription  price  discount.  Risk  to  the  underwriters  consists  of  three  elements: 
market  risk  (short-term  market  sentiment  and  volatility),  company-specific  risk  (short-term  issuer 
sentiment and issuer volatility) and the sensitivity of the company’s share price to general market 
movements (issuer’s beta). In addition, the degree of exposure of the underwriter, measured by the 
relative size of the issue (gross proceeds divided by market capitalization) minus the share of the issue 
pre-committed to, may also have an important impact on the discount. According to the Director-
General of Fair Trading (1995, p.15) and MMC (1999, 5.71) there is no consensus in the market as to 
what  risk  measure  is  to  be  used  by  underwriters  to  evaluate  the  risk  they  assume.  Some  sub-
underwriters seem to think it is company-specific risk that predominates whereas others believe that 
general market risk is more relevant.  
Model 1 shows that the risk factors are not related to the discount of open offers. Still, market 
volatility is significantly positively related to the subscription price discount of rights issues: larger 
discounts  are  negotiated  when  market  uncertainty  is  high.  The  issuer’s  total  risk  is  negatively 
correlated  to  the  rights’  discount,  but  beta  is  not  significant.  Recent  market  and  issuer  stock 
performance (market and issuer sentiment) are not related to the discount setting process either. Yet, 
when underwriter’s exposure, measured by the maximum equity stake that the (sub)underwriters have 
to purchase in a failed issue, is high, larger discounts in rights issues are negotiated. Thus, it seems that 
more volatile market returns and larger issue sizes relative to company size present higher risks to 
(sub)underwriters in rights issues, and therefore larger discounts are demanded.
24  
[insert Table 7 about here] 
 
We conjectured in section 6.2 that the choice of an open offer (and hence its discount) may 
depend on the issuers’ performance and growth perspectives. Model 2 reveals that industry-adjusted 
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performance does not influence the discount in open offers (nor in rights issues). Still, the lower the 
growth  opportunities
25,  measured  by  the  book-to-market  ratio,  the  smaller  the  discount  the 
underwriters  demand  in  open  offers.  Thus,  it  seems  that  high  market-to-book  ratios  embed  more 
uncertainty which is in turn reflected in higher discounts (Rau and Vermaelen 1998). The relation 
between growth and discount is not sustained for rights issues.  
Model  3  combines  the  risk,  growth  and  performance  variables.  The  model  confirms  that 
market risk and underwriter exposure lead to larger discounts in rights issues and that risk does not 
seem to have an impact on the open offer discount. The relation between growth opportunities and 
open offer discount is not sustained, probably as the number of open offers is small. The model also 
analyses the impact of the type of underwriter and of an extraordinary general meeting (EGM). In case 
an EGM is needed to approve a rights issue, it has to be held prior to any provisional allotment letters 
are sent out. This extends the issue period by two to three weeks, depending on whether ordinary or 
special resolutions need to be passed. Consequently, the risk of adverse stock price movements to the 
underwriter may increase, such that a higher discount is solicited by the (sub)underwriters.
26 As the 
parameter  coefficient  of  EGM  is  not  statistically  significant,  it  appears  that  no  extra  discount  is 
deemed  necessary  to  cover  this  additional  risk.  Judging  from  the  positive  and  significant  sign  of 
‘Sponsor=underwriter’, conflicts of interest of the sponsor/underwriter of the issue may play a role. 
When a sponsor also acts as lead underwriter, that sponsor/underwriter seems to ensure that a higher 
discount is set so as to reduce his risk in case the offer fails. Moreover, the top three underwriters in 
the  UK  seem  to  be  able  to  negotiate  a  higher  discount  with  the  company  as  the  variable  ‘Lead 
underwriter=major’  is  significantly  positive.  A  different  balance  of  power,  with  top  underwriters 
having more bargaining power in discount negotiations, may explain this result. The robustness of 
these  results  was  verified  by  estimating  other  models  with  variables  such as ownership  structure, 
company and issue size, the percentage pre-renunciations and the use of proceeds. The results reported 
above  remain  valid.  In  addition,  changing  the  time  period  over  which  volatilities  and  investor 
sentiment are measured and substituting a dummy variable capturing a state of financial distress for 
the relative ROA did not alter any results. 
  We  conclude  that  the  discount  in  rights  issues  depends  on  risk  factors  (mainly  market 
volatility and issue exposure) and that there is some (weak) evidence that the discount in open offers is 
related to growth opportunities. Finally, the type of underwriter also plays an important role in fixing 
the  discount.  Whereas  this  section  has  analyzed  the  discount  setting  process  from  an  underwriter 
perspective, we next investigate the choice of issue method from the current shareholders’ viewpoint.  
 
 
                                                           
25 The book-to-market ratio was set to zero in the four cases in which book value of equity was negative. 
26 This argument holds only for rights issues. In a rights issue the new shares are issued in nil-paid form as 
provisional allotment letters at the start of the offer period, such that the authorization to issue has to be obtained 
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6.4   The Choice of Issue Method. 
Let  us  investigate  the  choice  of  issue  method  by  type  of  (potential)  decision  maker:  the 
directors-owners,  the  directors  who  are  not  current  shareholders,  the  large  outsider  shareholders 
(institutions,  individuals  and  corporations),  and  the sponsor/underwriter. First, the director-owners 
owning  a  large  equity  stake  in  the  firm  may  be  wealth-constrained  such  that  exercising  all  their 
entitlements may be beyond their financial capacity. Thus, we expect that directors with small share 
stakes take up the seasoned equity in a small issue, but we expect a negative relation when directors 
own large shareholdings in larger equity issues. We find a positive correlation between directors’ 
required investment (their percentage stake multiplied by the gross proceeds to the issue) and the size 
of pre-renunciations (significant at the 1% level; not shown). This implies that the larger the required 
seasoned equity investment, the larger the renounced stake. When the renounced shares represent a 
large fraction of the issue, a rights issue becomes problematic as the pressure of a large supply of 
rights on the market depresses the premium (MMC, 1999) such that an open offer may be preferable.  
Second,  when  directors  do  not  own  any  shares,  the  ‘default’  rights  issue  may  be  chosen. 
Furthermore, a rights issue may be preferred for reasons of control retention as in open offers large 
blocks  more  likely  arise.  Diffuse  ownership  allows  executive  directors  to  retain  more  managerial 
discretion. We find that in all six issues in which directors did not own any shares, rights issues were 
performed.  
The third group of potential decision makers are the large outside shareholders. Institutional 
shareholders own (cumulatively) the largest percentage of equity in the average company. While they 
are less capital-constrained than individual shareholders, institutions’ decision to purchase seasoned 
equity may be influenced by considerations of portfolio rebalancing. When institutions do not wish to 
take up their entitlements, they may prefer to sell them directly to other institutions at a premium via 
an open offer. Other types of large shareholders may be indifferent regarding issue method provided 
the market for rights is liquid. When this liquidity condition is fulfilled, there is a trade-off between 
the premium of the rights issue and the lower discount in the open offer. To proxy for the liquidity of 
the market for nil-paid rights, we employ the finding of a Credit Suisse First Boston study appended to 
MMC (1999) which states that the efficiency of the market for rights is significantly influenced by the 
size and the weight of the issue, the liquidity of the existing company’s shares and the composition of 
the share register. Issue size is captured by the logarithm of the gross proceeds (Issue size) and the 
weight  is  the  relative  size  measured  by  dividing  the  gross  proceeds  by  the  company’s  market 
capitalization  (Exposure
27).  Larger  issues,  both  in  absolute  and  relative  terms,  are  ceteris  paribus 
expected  to  lead  to  a  more  liquid  rights  market.  The  same  argument  is  valid for the liquidity  of 
existing ordinary shares, proxied by trading velocity - the average number of shares traded in the last 
three months divided by the number of shares outstanding (Trading velocity). Thus, larger liquidity is 
expected to influence the preference for the rights method positively.  
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Finally, we also analyse whether the choice of method is influenced by the fact that a sponsor 
may act as lead underwriter. If this is the case, we expect a preference for rights issues as the lead 
underwriter can have a larger impact on the discount in a rights issue than in an open offer (see section 
6.3).  In  summary,  the  conditions  likely  to  lead  to  an  open  offer  are:  (i)  a  significant  required 
investment by directors; (ii) a high level of institutional ownership; (iii) an illiquid market for rights 
(proxied by trading velocity) (iv) high issue riskiness (proxied by market volatiliy, see section 6.3); (v) 
low  underwriter  risk  (exposure),  (vi)  the  sponsor  is  also  lead  underwriter,  and  (vii)  good  future 
prospects of the company (book-to-market, see section 6.3). 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
The probability that a rights issue is chosen is estimated in Table 8.
28 When the required 
investment in seasoned equity by directors is small, resulting from limited directors’ shareholdings 
(model 1) or from a small interaction of directors’ ownership and issue size (model 2), a rights issue is 
preferred. This probability is substantially reduced when the required investment increases (negative 
squared terms) as in this case, an open offer is preferred. Further analysis reveals that there is no 
significant difference in coefficients for executive and non-executive directors (not shown). We find 
little evidence for the hypothesis that large institutional ownership increases the probability of an open 
offer (not shown). Neither control by other outsiders nor total ownership concentration influences the 
choice of issue method. We do not find any evidence that underwriter exposure or trading velocity 
(proxying for the depth of the rights’ market) are determinants of the issue method. However, as 
predicted in the MCC study (1995), high market volatility increases the probability to opt for an open 
offer. Model 1 shows that good corporate growth perspectives make a firm opt for an open offer 
(although this relation is not statistically signficant). Expectedly, we find in model 3 that low growth 
opportunities, especially when combined with concentrated ownership held by directors or institutions 
favour the choice of rights as issue method. Neither the fact that the the sponsor or arranger is also the 
lead underwriter nor the fact that the lead underwriter is one one of the main UK underwriters is 
related to issue method choice (not shown). 
 
7.   Cross-sectional Analysis of Announcement Reactions. 
In this section, we analyze the determinants of the stock market reaction, measured by the two-
day cumulative abnormal returns at the announcement of a seasoned equity offering. In a first set of 
regressions
29,  we  focus  on  the  impact  of  ownership  concentration  on  the  share  price  reaction.  A 
reduction in ownership concentration held by directors is greeted positively by the market, reflecting a 
reduction of potential insider entrenchment (model 1a,b of Table 9). Further detailed analysis (not 
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shown) reveals that at high levels of insider ownership an increase in managerial stakes is perceived as 
a significantly negative signal. Model 1b also shows that the CARs are positive and significant when 
ownership levels are high and when there is a reduction of ownership concentration as a consequence 
of the equity issue. It seems that the negative aspects of a reduction in shareholder monitoring is more 
than offset by the advantage of increased liquidity (Kothare 1997). Trading velocity is twice as large in 
firms in the lowest quintile of ownership concentration compared to the highest quintile. The findings 
on total ownership concentration are in line with those of Short and Keasey (1999) who report a 
quadratic relation between the size of blockholders and the amount of monitoring and control exerted 
by them. At low levels of ownership concentration they report a positive control effect that reverses at 
high levels as strong ownership concentration by both insiders and outsiders may lead to excessive 
private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000). Apart from 
the effects of director and total ownership, there is little evidence of a relation between announcement 
reaction to an equity offering and the ownership structure and changes therein.
30  
[insert Table 9 about here] 
 
In model 2a of table 9, we find that the market reacts positively to equity issues of which the 
proceeds will be used for debt reduction. The positive reaction to the debt reduction is contrary to the 
capital structure pecking order predictions of Myers and Majluf (1984). Ross (1977) and Heinkel 
(1982)  also  contend  that  a  reduction  in  leverage  signals  lower  firm  value.  Still  the  positive 
announcement reaction may be induced by the UK tax system. In contrast to a ‘classical’ tax system as 
found in the US, an imputation tax system is employed in the UK. Howard and Brown (1992) show 
that in cases where investors are subject to marginal income tax rates greater than the corporate tax 
rate, the imputation system can be biased against debt. For this reason, a reduction in leverage is not 
necessarily a bad signal to some types of shareholders. Even in the wake of financial distress (model 
2b), this positive market reaction to debt reduction remains significant because a rights issue may be 
related to the refinancing (and hence survival) of ailing firms (Franks et al. 2001). Galai and Masulis 
(1976) argue that an equity issue decreases bankruptcy risk because it lowers leverage. When the 
proceeds are destined for future (usually unnamed) acquisitions, the market reaction is positive, but 
not when the firm is in financial distress (model 2b).   
  A  seasoned  equity  issue  may  constitute  a  wealth  transfer  from  the  shareholders  to  the 
bondholders.  We calculate the  potential wealth transfer  for  every equity issue  (see  appendix) and 
estimate whether or not the market reaction reacts negatively to the potential wealth transfer. The 
sample of non-distressed companies experiences an average (median) wealth transfer over gross issue 
proceeds of 29.9% (1.2%) while distressed companies suffer from a larger average (median) transfer 
of 47.4% (26.6%). In the lowest leverage quintile the average (median) wealth transfer equals 8.3% (-
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0.2%) compared to 85.7% (76.4%) in the highest quintile, which is significant at the 1% level in both 
parametric and non-parametric tests and supports the prediction by Franks and Torous (1989) that 
wealth transfers are larger in financially distressed firms
31. Furthermore, the wealth transfer is higher 
in rights issues (mean transfer of 48.9% with median of 33.5%) than in open offers (mean of 16.9% 
with median of 0.6%). This partially results from the fact that companies performing rights issues have 
higher average leverage. The fact that the wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders in an 
equity issue is positively related to the announcement reaction of the issue (model 3a,b) is at first sight 
puzzling. Still, it should be noted that only the current shareholders suffer from the wealth transfer and 
not the new shareholders purchasing new equity. The positive effect of the wealth transfer remains 
even though we control for financial distress and relative performance (models 3a,b). When firms are 
performing  poorly  (measured  by  negative  relative  ROA),  the  market  reacts  positive  to  the 
announcement of an equity issue, because the new funds may be used to restructure the firm (model 
3b).  Still,  this  positive  effect  disappears  for  severely  financially  distressed  firms.  Models  3a,b 
corroborate the findings by Armitage (1999) and Slovin et al. (2000): the market reacts negatively to 
deeply discounted rights issues and open offers. Although the discount is substantially larger in rights 
issues (see above), the market reaction does not differ across issue methods.  
As conjectured, the market seems to approve that growth firms (low book-to-market) increase 
their equity capital base (model 4). The positive announcement reaction is stronger for larger firms 
provided they are not in financial distress.  
We  further  examine  whether  the above  findings regarding  ownership, the  proceeds of  the 
issue, wealth transfer and discount, and growth remain valid in a global model. While taking care to 
avoid multicollinarity, we estimate models 5a and b. The results confirm that there is little evidence of 
the impact of ownership structure on the CARs. Large outside ownership (held by individuals and 
corporations) is negatively related to the announcement returns. This negative relation is weakened 
when outsider ownership concentration is reduced as a consequence of the equity issue. Thus, it seems 
that the reduction of potential monitoring of management is more than compensated by increased 
share liquidity. We also find strong evidence that the market reaction is to a large extent influenced by 
the announcement of how the proceeds of the seasoned equity offering will be employed. If the firm 
indicates that the proceeds are to be used for debt reduction or (unnamed) acquisitions, the market 
reaction is significantly positive unless the firm reducing its debt level is financially distressed (model 
5a). Model 5b shows that  financial  distress  negatively  influences  the market reaction to an issue. 
Suzuki (1997) who states that share prices react much more negatively when a manager plans to use 
the proceeds for a company’s internal project rather than to fund a takeover.  
The results regarding relative issue size and book-to-market turn insignificant, but large issues 
trigger positive abnormal returns. An equity issue at a discount to the current market price may imply 
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an increase in total dividend payments (Hietala and Loyttyniemi, 1992). High current dividend payout 
ratios may lead to larger dividend increases implicit in the share issue, which could be reflected in a 
more positive share price reaction. Our data do not support this hypothesis as the coefficient of Payout 
suggests the opposite. Either investors do not value an increased dividend yield subsequent to the issue 
or companies cut their dividends per share subsequent to the issue (which is very unlikely e.g. Marsh, 
1992).   
While major underwriters are able to negotiate a higher discount (see section 6.3), the market 
announcement reaction considers neither who is underwriting the issue nor underwriter risk. While the 
market does not seem to properly take into account the potential wealth transfer from shareholders to 
bondholders, a deep offer price discount is interpreted as a negative signal.  
 
8. Conclusions. 
This paper has documented the regulatory and financial consequences of the choice of issue 
method of seasoned equity. The market reactions to the announcements of rights issues and open 
offers were computed and its the determinants were analyzed. Furthermore, we examined the choice of 
issue method, the setting of the offer price discount and the decision to underwrite an offering. In 
particular, we investigated the impact of ownership structure, issue risk, future growth opportunities, 
financial distress, the use of issue proceeds and the type of underwriter.  
We obtained the following results. First, the decision to underwrite an equity issue in the UK 
is different than in other countries, like the US, where underwriting of rights issues usually occurs 
when the expected take-up of current shareholders is low. In the UK rights issues and open offers are 
virtually always underwritten except when the issuer is a small firm in severe financial difficulties. 
Consequently, the announcement of a UK non-underwritten equity offer triggers a strongly negative 
announcement  reaction,  which  confirms  that  the  underwriting  process  fulfills  a  certification  role. 
Recently, there has been some discussion in the UK about motivating well-performing companies to 
perform non-underwritten issues at a (deep) discount as this saves underwriter costs. However, the 
argument of advisers, whether self-interested or not, that it may give a negative signal about firm 
quality is not unreasonable when judged in light of the results of this paper. 
Second, we found that underwriters have an important impact on the setting of the offer price 
discount in rights issues. They are primarily interested in reducing the risk of having to purchase the 
shares of a failed issue. The main risk factors which these underwriters consider are stock market 
volatility  and  issue  exposure.  We  also  find  evidence  that  conflicts  of  interest  of  the 
sponsor/underwriter of the issue play a role: when a sponsor also acts as lead underwriter, larger 
discounts are set. Moreover, the top three underwriters in the UK, who may have more bargaining 
power in discount negotiations with the issuing firm, also set higher discounts. There is no relation 
between  price  discount  in  open  offers  and  the  risk  of  adverse  price  effects,  possibly  because  the 
discount is restricted to 10% in open offers. There is some evidence of a positive relation between the   Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




the discount in open offers and the market-to-book ratio: high growth opportunities are reflected in a 
higher discount, embedding a higher degree of uncertainty.  
Third, the choice between performing a rights issue or an open offer depends mainly on the 
interests of directors, future growth opportunities, stock market uncertainty and the liquidity in the 
market  for  rights.  A  large  required investment  by  insiders,  large market  volatility and  an illiquid 
market for rights induce companies to issue shares by means of an open offer. Low corporate growth 
perspectives make a firm opt for an a rights issue, especially when directors or institutions own a large 
share stake.  
Finally,  we  find  that  the  issuers  of  underwritten  rights  offers  experience  a  significantly 
negative abnormal announcement return of –2.3% whereas the market reacts positively (by 2.8%) to 
the  announcement  of  an  underwritten  open  offer.  Most  of  the  positive  share  price  announcement 
reaction  is  explained  by  high  pre-issue  levels  of  director  ownership  and  ownership  concentration 
combined with a decrease in both of these levels, by the use of the proceeds for acquisitions or debt 
reductions, by the size of the issue, by large wealth transfers and by better growth opportunities. 
Announcement effects are more negative when the firm is in financial distress or performs poorly, 
when large discounts are made (which signals issue uncertainty) and when there are fewer growth 
opportunities.    Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    
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Appendix:  Calculation of Wealth Transfers 
 
Wealth transfers from shareholders to debtholders resulting from an equity issue are computed 
using Merton’s (1974) model. By estimating the market values of debt and equity before and after the 
seasoned equity issue, we can calculate these wealth transfers. 
Equity is viewed as a call option on the assets of the firm with an exercise price equal to the 
face value of debt: 
(1)    VE = Call (VA, DB, sA, rf, T) 
(2)    VA = VE + VB 
where Call (×) is the Black-Scholes valuation of a European call option. VA is the unobservable market 
value of the company’s assets, VE the market value of equity three months before the issue
32 and VB 
the unobservable market value of debt. The face value of debt DB and the time to maturity T were 
collected from annual reports. Four categories of debt were observed: debt maturing within one year 
(including trade credit), within 1 and 2 years, within 2 and 5 years and after 5 years. Because the 
model assumes only one class of debt, a single measure of time to maturity must be used. Here it is 
assumed  to  be  a  weighted  average  of  the  four  maturities,  taken  to  be  ½,  1½,  3½  and  10  years 
respectively. The risk-free rate rf was estimated over the year of issue from a basket of government 
bonds  and  is  assumed  to  be  constant  by  the  Merton  model.  The  volatility  of  assets  sA  is  not 
observable. Instead, it is inferred from the short-term volatility of equity returns sE measured from 
daily price data over six to three months before the issue to avoid event-induced variance. It follows 
from Itô’s Lemma that: 
(3)    sE / sA  9E 9A) * ( VA / VE) 
By differentiating the expression for VE in Merton (1974) with respect to VA it follows that the partial 
derivative of these two variables is equal to N(d1) in the Black-Scholes model. The values of VA, VB 
and sA can be found by solving this system of three equations. For plausible values there is a unique 
solution. 
Under the assumption that the value of the firm is independent of capital structure
33, the value 
and  volatility of assets after  the issue  should  remain constant when the proceeds to the issue are 
applied  fully  to  reduce  debt.  In  these  cases  the  theoretical  post-issue  value  of  equity  could  be 
calculated from the Black-Scholes formula using the pre-issue value and volatility of assets. However, 
these  variables  change  if  (part  of)  the  proceeds  are  used  to  undertake  investment  projects  or 
acquisitions. The net present value of the projects financed by the proceeds to the issue is not known. 
It is therefore assumed that the proceeds are not invested but held as cash, so that the value of assets 
                                                           
32 The value of equity is measured at three months before announcement of the issue to avoid incorporating price 
run-ups. 
33 The Merton model assumes that the firm’s assets follow a geometric Brownian motion whose parameters are 
independent of capital structure.   Rights-preserving issue methods of seasoned equity    




increases by the amount raised and the volatility of assets will remain the same
34. The theoretical post-
issue value and volatility of equity, as well as the value of debt can then be found from equations 1 
through 3 using the newly found value of assets. From Galai and Masulis (1976: 65) it follows that, 
had there been no dilution of leverage, the increase in the value of equity and debt would have been 
proportional to the increase in the value of assets. To measure possible wealth transfers from one set of 
claimholders to the other, the post-issue values therefore have to be normalized by the pre-issue value 
of assets. Moreover, if proceeds to the issue are used to repay debt, the amount repaid is assumed to be 
invested at the prevailing interest rate so that the market value of the repayment to the debtholder is 
the same as the book value
35. The wealth transfer is then calculated as: 
(4)    W = VB’ × (VA/VA’) – VB + V(repayment) 
where W is the wealth transfer, V(repayment) is the value of the debt claims repaid to debtholders, and 
VB’ and VA’ are post-issue market values of debt and assets, respectively. 
It should be emphasized that if the firm invests in projects yielding a positive NPV (rather than 
merely generating the cost of capital), the change in leverage as calculated here will be understated. 
Therefore  wealth  transfers  will  also  be  understated.  Moreover,  if  the  volatility  of  asset  returns 
decreases, the theoretical post-issue value of debt increases, resulting in higher wealth transfers than 
formula 4 gives. An increase in asset volatilities has the reverse effect. Furthermore, the Merton model 
assumes costless bankruptcy procedures that occur only at maturity. A violation of this assumption 
may affect the outcome for firms close to financial distress because bankruptcy costs are generally 
borne by debtholders.  The  value of debt may  thus  be overestimated for these companies. Further 
assumptions by the Merton model are that there should be no violations of absolute priority in case of 
bankruptcy, there should be no issues of (diluting) senior debt prior to maturity of the present claims 
and  there are no taxes. Given the large number of assumptions made, one needs to be careful in 
interpreting the results from these calculations. However, they are useful as a rough and conservative 
approximation of wealth transfers triggered by equity issues. 
                                                           
34 Alternatively, one could assume that proceeds are invested at the risk-free rate of return so that the net present 
value of the project is non-stochastic and equal to the proceeds to the issue. 
35 This assumption was made because, for most claims, the rate of interest charged to the company is unknown.   30 
 
Table 1. Abnormal returns to announcement of seasoned equity issues. 
Abnormal returns to announcement of seasoned equity offerings by industrial firms are shown by country. Two-day cumulative abnormal returns over day -1 and 0 
are stated, unless noted otherwise. Returns are categorized according to issue method: rights issues (underwritten, not underwritten or all rights issues if no difference is 
made), public and private issues.
  ***, 
**, 
* stand for  significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 
a monthly abnormal return measured over the month of announcement,
 b total 
announcement return reported instead of abnormal return, 
 c significance not reported, 
 d cumulative abnormal return over days -3 to 0, 
 e cumulative abnormal return over day 
0 to +1,





Country  Study  Event Period  Two-day Announcement Effect (in %)    
      Rights Issues  Public  Private 
         Not Underwritten  Underwritten  All  Issues  Issues 
UK  Marsh (1979)  1962-1975       2.10
**a     
  Armitage (1999)  1985-1996      -0.93
***     
  Slovin et al. (2000)  1986-1994  -4.96
***  -2.90
***       1.22 
US  Asquith and Mullins (1986)  1963-1981        -2.70
***   
  Masulis and Korwar (1986)  1963-1980        -3.25
***b   
  Mikkelson and Partch (1986)  1972-1982        -3.56
***   
  Hansen(1988)  1964-1986    -1.21
***       
  Wruck (1989)  1979-1985           1.89
* 
  Eckbo and Masulis (1992)  1963-1981  -1.39  -1.03
**    -3.34
***   
  Hertzel and Smith (1993)  1980-1987           1.72
**d 
  Singh (1997)  1963-1985    -1.07
***       
New Zealand  Marsden (2000)  1976-1994   0.75
**e  -1.74
***e  -1.01
***e     
Netherlands  De Jong and Veld (1998)  1977-1996  -1.46
*f      -0.41  -0.52 
  Koevoets (1999)  1983-1998      -3.83
***   0.63   
Sweden  Molin (1996)  1980-1994      -0.89
f     3.21
*f 
Finland  Hietala and Loyttyniemi (1991)  1975-1988       4.15
***f     
Greece  Tsangarakis (1996)  1981-1990   3.97
***         
Japan  Kang and Stulz (1996)  1985-1991       2.21
***   0.51
*   3.88
*** 
Korea  Kang (1990)  1984-1987       0.96
c     
  Kim and Lee (1990)  1984-1986       3.20
a, c     
  Dhatt et al. (1996)  1977-1991       2.41
***a     
Norway  Bøhren et al. (1997)  1980-1993   1.55
***  -0.23   0.47
**     
Switzerland  Loderer and Zimmerman (1988)  1973-1983       2.60






Table 2. Frequency distribution of seasoned equity issuance announcements by British firms (1992-99). 
 
      all issues     rights issues     open offers     placings 
1999    20    4    5    11 
1998    14    6    1    7 
1997    10    4    3    3 
1996    16    7    2    7 
1995    10    3    3    4 
1994    9    7    1    1 
1993    12    6    2    4 
1992    4    2    1    1 
Total    95    39    18    38 
 





Table 3. Descriptive statistics for seasoned equity offerings by British firms (1992-99). 
Descriptive statistics are disaggregated by offer type. Difference in means tests and Mann-Whitney-tests for differences in median values were performed for the sub-
sample of underwritten rights issues versus open offers. Significant results are indicated in the underwritten rights issue column. The offer price discount is measured as the 
share price the day prior to announcement minus the subscription price divided by the share price the day prior to announcement. The discount is also calculated using the 
theoretical ex-rights price (TERP). TERP is the market share price the day prior to announcement x (number of old shares / total of old and new shares) + the subscription 
price x (number of new shares / total of old and new shares). The standardized relative return on assets (ROA) is computed as the ROA in the last fiscal year minus the issuer’s 
industry average divided by the standard deviation of industry ROA. The issuer’s industry is determined by the Compustat industry sector code. The use of proceeds is 
partitioned into three categories one of which is investments (which includes unnamed future acquisitions). The take-up percentage represents the reported number of shares 
taken up at the close of the offering excluding shares that were placed ’firm’ prior to the offer period (this includes any pre-renunciations) divided by the the total number of 
shares open to subscription by current shareholders (this excludes ’firm’ placed shares subject to joint placings). Source: Perfect Information, Sequencer, Regulatory News 
Service messages (via Reuters Business Briefing), London Share Price Database, Thomson SDC Platinum, Compustat and Datastream. 
***, 
**, 
* stands for  significance at the 
1, 5 and 10% level. 
 a Four negative M/B ratios were set to zero. This does not affect the results in this paper. One highly negative price-earnings ratio due to very small 
negative earnings was set to -100%.
 c Four negative leverage ratios in the sample due to negative book value of equity were set to 100%.
 d Percentages add up to more than 
100% because some firms announce multiple uses of funds 
      all issues (n=95)  underwritten rights issues (n=38) underwritten open offers (n=14)  placings (n=38) 
         mean  median  st. dev.  mean  median  st. dev.  mean  median  st. dev.  mean  median  st. dev. 
Ratio of common shares issued to common shares outstanding (%)  28.01  18.87  46.50  37.38  29.29  24.55  25.90  20.17  15.18  4.66  4.96  1.86 
Ratio of gross proceeds to market value one month before issue (%)  24.01  14.97  47.43  30.49  26.16  16.76  25.58  19.59  14.56  4.71  4.91  2.13 
Discount to market price one day prior to announcement (%)  9.17  7.69  10.99  16.02
***  15.75
***  8.28  3.75  3.26  3.05  2.94  4.05  6.36 
Discount to TERP (%) one day prior to announcement (%)  7.27  6.09  8.50  12.28
***  12.22
***  5.48  3.03  2.73  2.56  2.85  3.87  6.08 
Firm size as measured by:                           
  Total assets at end of last fiscal year (£m)  301.05  47.68  652.19  492.32
***  83.63
**  840.89  92.80  31.05  122.21  222.38  31.19  545.77 
  Total revenues at end of last fiscal year (£m)  333.53  26.27  884.43  545.96
**  74.76
**  1166.52  52.54  20.28  73.48  264.39  15.29  728.72 
  Market value one month before issue (£m)  317.41  61.60  813.81  270.00
*  73.29  366.02  133.31  64.32  194.12  472.55  94.74  1217.81 
Return on assets at end of last fiscal year (%)  -4.67  2.49  19.21  -4.64  2.32  18.41  0.45  3.55  13.66  -7.25  3.43  22.57 
Return on assets, standardized relative to industry mean  -0.49  -0.21  1.29  -0.46  -0.18  1.24  -0.61  -0.27  1.49  -0.44  0.05  1.28 
Market-to-book value, measured one month before issue
a  4.49  3.20  5.25  2.82
**  1.74
*  2.73  4.62  3.48  3.31  6.49  4.26  7.12 
Price-earnings ratio, measured one month before issue
b  4.68  9.24  44.99  2.89  9.28  41.06  -3.31  13.74  44.52  13.75  10.97  49.07 
Payout-ratio, average over last three fiscal years (%)  21.13  5.84  35.45  27.33  25.33  40.25  18.36  10.80  21.76  18.73  0  30.32 
Leverage, measured by book value of debt over common equity (%)
c  82.84  47.63  117.92  80.18  62.37  80,80  38.26  38.04  29.59  82.03  28.16  137.90 
Leverage, measured by market value of debt over common equity (%)  39.64  17.62  58.98  51.09
***  30.57
**  49.18  18.30  11.13  22.70  18.01  6.64  24.69 
Use of proceeds
d    n  %    n  %    n  %    n  %   
  investments    57  60    21  55    9  64    25  66   
  debt reduction    35  37    21  55    4  29    7  18   
  working capital    19  20    4  11    5  36    8  21   
Take-up by current shareholders (%)          76.99
***  92.39
***  26.53  46.69  51.71  26.40       





Table 4. Frequency distribution of financially distressed seasoned equity issuers in the UK (1992-99). 
This table shows the frequency distribution of financially distressed companies performing seasoned equity issues in the UK in the period 1992-1999, disaggregated 
by issue method. A firm is in financial distress when: (1) the issuer’s return on assets (excluding extraordinary items) is in the lowest ROA decile of all companies that are part 
of the FTSE All-Share index in the offering year; (2) the issuer’s book value of debt over equity (leverage) is in the highest leverage decile of all companies that are part of the 
FTSE All-Share index in the offering year; (3) the interest cover (EBITDA divided by total interest expense) in the offering year is lower than two; (4) there are two or more 
subsequent dividend cuts within two years around the offering period or any dividend omissions in the offering year; (5) the issuer’s listing on the stock exchange was 
suspended or cancelled within a time frame of two years around the offering period; (6) the issuer was taken over by another party within a time frame of two years after the 
offering period due to poor performance and; (7) the issuer entered administrative receivership or was liquidated within a time frame of two years after the offering period. 
Source: London Share Price Database and Compustat.
 a Percentages do not add up to 100% because some companies satisfy more than one criterion 
 






issues  placings 
      n  %  n  %  n  %  n  %  n  % 
                       
in financial distress, of which:  51  53.68  18  47.37  6  42.86  5  100.00  22  57.89 
in this subsample, number of issuers:
a                     
  in lowest ROA decile  41  80.39  15  83.33  6  100.00  4  80.00  16  72.73 
  in highest leverage decile  18  35.29  7  38.89  0  0  4  80.00  7  31.82 
  interest cover < 2  41  80.39  17  94.44  5  83.33  3  60.00  16  72.73 
  dividend cuts / omissions  46  90.20  17  94.44  6  100.00  5  100.00  18  81.82 
  listing suspended/cancelled  6  11.76  1  5.56  0  0  2  40.00  3  13.64 
  distress related taken over  3  5.88  1  5.56  0  0  1  20.00  1  4.55 
  in bankruptcy  2  3.92  0  0.00  0  0  1  20.00  1  4.55 
not financially distressed  44  46.32  20  52.63  8  57.14  0  0  16  42.11 
                       
total    95  100.00  38  100.00  14  100.00  5  100.00  38  100.00 
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Table 5. Ownership structure of British companies offering seasoned equity (1992-99). 
Ownership concentration, measured as a Herfindahl index of the five largest shareholders of the issuing company 
reported  on  a  scale  of  100,  and  a  breakdown  of  shareholdings  of  institutions,  various  directors,  corporate  and  other 
individuals  are  reported  for  a  sample  of  British  firms  issuing  seasoned  equity  in  the  period  1992-1999.  Holdings  are 
computed as the number of shares held divided by the total number of shares outstanding prior to the issue. Director 
holdings  include  all  shareholdings  regardless  of  size,  whereas  institutional,  corporate  and  individual blockholdings are 
reported as the sum of all holdings that exceed 3% of the issuer’s total outstanding share capital. Executive and non-
executive directors’ holdings exclude the stake of the CEO and chairman of the company, which are stated separately. 
Percentage changes in percentage shareholdings as a result of the equity issue are reported between brackets. They are 
computed as ((s + v) / s) / ((x + p) / x) - 1, with; s being the number of shares held by the party of interest prior to issue; v is 
the number of new shares purchased; x the total number of shares outstanding prior to issue and; p the total number of new 
shares issued. Source: Perfect Information, Sequencer, Worldscope and Regulatory News Service messages (via Reuters 
Business Briefing). 
 
     mean (%)  median (%)  st. dev. (%) 
  %  % change  %  % change  %  % change 
Herfindahl index             
  all issues  7.74  (-0.50)  4.17  (-7.90)  9.78  (37.19) 
  underwritten rights issues  7.69  (1.99)  3.99  (-4.31)  11.13  (50.19) 
  underwritten open offers  10.69  (-9.73)  4.69  (-18.99)  12.07  (31.23) 
  placings  6.55  (-0.83)  3.34  (-7.46)  7.51  (17.99) 
Institutional ownership             
  all issues  26.20  (6.31)  22.93  (0)  18.79  (23.12) 
  underwritten rights issues  24.74  (8.84)  23.52  (0)  15.02  (25.01) 
  underwritten open offers  31.77  (4.39)  26.42  (0)  22.52  (19.17) 
  placings  27.06  (2.29)  22.95  (-1.85)  21.11  (15.61) 
CEO ownership             
  all issues  5.57  (-4.57)  3.11  (0)  11.05  (10.19) 
  underwritten rights issues  6.36  (-4.98)  0.25  (0)  11.78  (13.15) 
  underwritten open offers  8.66  (-7.05)  1.54  (-0.92)  14.84  (9.17) 
  placings  4.24  (-2.11)  0.20  (-2.76)  9.23  (4.08) 
Chairman ownership             
  all issues  3.50  (-4.25)  0.02  (0)  9.95  (13.43) 
  underwritten rights issues  3.64  (-4.21)  0.03  (0)  9.88  (9.12) 
  underwritten open offers  6.04  (-9.20)  0.19  (0)  16.52  (12.12) 
  placings  1.59  (-1.78)  0  (0)  3.76  (2.25) 
Executive directors             
  all issues  2.55  (-7.12)  0.08  (0)  6.93  (12.25) 
  underwritten rights issues  2.38  (-6.39)  0.07  (0)  7.40  (11.12) 
  underwritten open offers  4.78  (-11.34)  0.26  (-9.46)  10.71  (12.02) 
  placings  1.96  (-3.54)  0.07  (-1.93)  4.91  (7.58) 
Non-executive directors             
  all issues  1.62  (-0.97)  0.08  (0)  3.37  (40.61) 
  underwritten rights issues  0.88  (-6.97)  0.04  (0)  2.48  (12.26) 
  underwritten open offers  1.58  (-6.12)  0.03  (-3.13)  3.51  (7.97) 
  placings  1.81  (-1.84)  0.08  (-2.26)  3.24  (4.60) 
Corporate blockholders             
  all issues  4.76  (2.48)  0  (0)  11.94  (26.68) 
  underwritten rights issues  4.81  (4.54)  0  (0)  13.34  (38.60) 
  underwritten open offers  1.14  (-0.90)  0  (0)  2.47  (2.44) 
  placings  4.62  (-0.53)  0  (0)  10.31  (4.91) 
Individual blockholders             
  all issues  2.22  (-1.05)  0  (0)  5.06  (11.33) 
  underwritten rights issues  2.56  (-3.34)  0  (0)  6.09  (9.27) 
  underwritten open offers  0.40  (-0.71)  0  (0)  1.50  (2.67) 
  placings  2.63  (0.97)  0  (0)  4.90  (15.10) 




Table 6. Abnormal returns of British firms issuing seasoned equity. 
This table shows the abnormal stock returns of British firms issuing equity, disaggregated by offer type. Average 
abnormal returns and the percentage of negative abnormal returns are reported over trading days -20 to +10, day zero being 
the announcement day. Cumulative average abnormal returns over days -1 to 0 and -1 to +1 are also reported. Abnormal 
returns were calculated using a market model estimated over trading days -180 to -31, with the FTSE All-Share Index as 
market index. Tests of significance were computed by means of t-statistics on standardized abnormal returns, and a non-
parametric z-test on the proportion of negative abnormal returns. Source: daily price data from Datastream and Sequencer. 
 
day     underwritten rights issues (n=38)  underwritten open offers (n=14)  placings (n=38) 
      AR (%)  % negative  AR (%)  % negative  AR (%)  % negative 
-20    -0.189  63.16  -0.234  64.29  0.374  52.63 
-19    -0.191  60.53  0.919  50.00  1.067  44.74 
-18    -0.017  55.26  -0.527  71.43  0.948  42.11 
-17    -0.150  55.26  -0.010  57.14  -0.175  55.26 
-16    0.089  55.26  0.601  50.00  0.420  39.47 
-15    0.018  42.11  0.937  57.14  0.650  50.00 
-14    -0.166  63.16  0.240  64.29  1.045  42.11 
-13    -0.104  65.79
*  -0.365  71.43  0.066  44.74 
-12    -0.117  71.05
**  -0.276  57.14  0.812
**  42.11 
-11    -0.169  63.16  -0.843
*  85.71
***  0.158  44.74 
-10    -0.572
**  63.16  0.127  50.00  -0.693  63.16 
-9    -0.071  65.79  1.883  57.14  0.220  39.47 
-8    -0.208  68.42
**  0.460  71.43  0.209
*  39.47 
-7    -0.163  60.53  -0.256  50.00  -0.323  50.00 
-6    -0.359
*  60.53  -0.052  50.00  0.516
**  39.47 
-5    -0.244  60.53  -0.928
*  71.43  0.133  44.74 
-4    -0.187  55.26  -0.346  57.14  0.032  42.11 
-3    -0.284  65.79  -0.561  78.57
**  -0.382  50.00 
-2    -0.091  63.16  0.171  57.14  0.314  57.89 
-1    -0.401
**  81.58
***  -0.184  64.29  -0.231  63.16 




***  1.235  44.74 
+1    0.513  44.74  1.491  42.86  0.565  39.47 
+2    0.359  52.63  -0.499  57.14  0.569  50.00 
+3    -0.162  55.26  0.361  50.00  1.484
**  39.47 
+4    -0.468  65.79
*  0.269  50.00  -0.419  57.89 
+5    0.177  52.63  0.276  50.00  0.331  50.00 
+6    0.364  50.00  -0.758
*  71.43  -0.135  55.26 
+7    0.140  52.63  0.172  64.29  -0.090  44.74 
+8    0.185  63.16  -0.401  57.14  0.474  42.11 
+9    0.129  55.26  -0.294  78.57
**  0.616  50.00 
+10    -0.216  60.53  -0.407  64.29  -0.022  52.63 
               
Cumulative abnormal returns:           




**  1.004  44.74 
CAR (-1, 0, 1)  -1.801
*  63.16  4.060
***  21.43
**  1.569  39.47 




Table 7. Cross-sectional regressions of issue price discount on underwritten rights issues and 
open offers. 
 
Regression results (OLS) for issue price discount on 52 offerings by British firms between 1992-1999. The subscription 
price discount, the dependent variable, is measured as the closing share price on the day prior to announcement minus the 
subscription price divided by the closing price the day prior to announcement. Market sentiment is the average daily return 
on the FTSE All-Share Index in the three months before announcement. Market volatility is the standard deviation of 
returns on the FTSE All-Share Index in the three months before announcement. Issuer sentiment is the average return on 
the issuer’s shares in the three months prior to announcement. Issuer volatility is the standard deviation of returns on the 
issuer’s shares in the three months prior to announcement. Beta is the market model beta calculated in section 5 of this 
paper.  It represents  systematic  risk.   Exposure equals the relative size of the issue (gross proceeds divided by market 
capitalization) minus the share of the issue pre-committed to. T-values are between brackets. 
***,
**,
* stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Dep. Variable   Issue discount  Issue discount  Issue discount 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Risk  Performance/Growth  Global 
  Coef.   t-stat  Coef.   t-stat  Coef.   t-stat 
Intercept  8.513  2.641  12.397
***  7.470  5.585  1.416 
Market volatility  -1608.978  -1.561      -973.601  -0.804 
Market sentiment  1113.502  0.694      639.756  0.364 
Issuer volatility  219.585  1.074      95.725  0.323 
Issuer sentiment  343.000  0.496      370.967  0.488 
Beta  -1.369  -0.562      -0.001  -0.005 
Exposure  0.001  0.092      -0.001  -0.094 
Book-to-market      -13.774
***  -3.057  -0.970  -0.214 
Relative ROA      -0.984  -0.465  0.782  0.760 
Interaction terms: rights issues (rights=1)           
Market volatility*rights  2763.829
***  3.030      2006.943
*  1.769 
Market sentiment*rights  893.249  0.504      1725.709  0.858 
Issuer volatility*rights  -667.176
**  -2.361      -363.061  -1.060 
Issuer sentiment*rights  -608.018  -0.813      -729.93  -0.892 
Beta*rights  -1.710  -0.629      -3.085  -1.017 
Exposure*rights  0.293
**  2.492      0.279
**  2.294 
Book-to-market*rights      19.743
***  4.658  0.009  0.017 
Relative ROA*rights      0.729  0.316  -0.762  -0.590 
EGM          -1.103  -0.471 
Sponsor=underwriter (yes=1)          3.754
*  1.875 
Lead underwriter=major (yes=1)          3.709
*  1.918 
Adjusted R
2  0.728    0.299    0.688   
F  12.357
***    6.237
***    6.816
***   




Table 8. Logit regressions of the probability that a rights issue is chosen. 
Logit regression results on a sample of 52 rights issues and offers in which insiders own shares in the issuing 
company. The logit model is ln (p / (1-p)) = Intercept + BX, where p is the probability that a rights issue will be performed. 
Director ownership is the percentage equity owned by directors prior to the seasoned offering. The squared variable is also 
included. Total ownership concentration is the Herfindahl index calculated over the five largest shareholders of the issuer 
prior to the issue. The squared variable is also included. Issue size is the natural logarithm of gross proceeds to the issue. 
Trading velocity is the average number of shares traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding in the three 
months prior to announcement. Market volatility is the standard deviation of returns on the FTSE All-Share Index in the 
three months before announcement. T-values are between brackets. 
***,
**,
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively.  
 
Directors’ ownership  0.307
*  -96.892
*    ( + ) 




*    ( - ) 
  (-1.882)  (1.846)     
   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  Expected sign 
Intercept  -2.508  1.231
***  -3.472   
  (-0.559)  (2.525)  (-1.120)   
Director ownership * issue size    13.399
*    ( + ) 
    (1.771)     
Directors’ ownership
2 * issue size    -25.192
*    ( - ) 
    (-1.796)     
Total ownership concentration  6.672      ( + ) 
  (0.186)       
Total ownership concentration
2  -71.294      ( - ) 
  (-0.580)       
Issue size  0.609    0.454  ( + ) 
  (1.344)    (1.217)   
Exposure  0.041      ( ? ) 
  (0.989)       
Trading velocity  -11.187      ( + ) 
  (-0.637)       
Market volatility  -539.864
*      ( - ) 
  (-1.886)       
Book-to-market  1.758      ( + ) 
  (1.327)       
Directors’ ownership * Book-to-market      -8.741
*  ( - ) 
      (-1.785)   
Institutional ownership * Book-to-market      -17.025
**  ( - ) 
      (-2.058)   
Corporate ownership * Book-to-market      33.448  ( ? ) 
      (0.977)   
Ownership by individuals* Book-to-market      18.046  ( ? ) 
      (0.814)   
Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Chi-Square  46.129
*  49.644
***  40.703
*   
p  0.064  0.004  0.065     38 
Table 9. Cross-sectional regressions of CAR on underwritten seasoned equity offering. 
OLS regression results for two-day announcement returns on 52 underwritten rights issues and open offer by British firms between 1992 and 1999. The announcement returns 
were calculated using a market model with adjustment for thin trading.Proceeds for acquisition and Proceeds for debt reduction equal 1 when the proceeds to the issue are 
used for investments/acquisitions, or debt reduction respectively. Issue size is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s market capitalization. Relative issue size equals the relative 
size of the issue (gross proceeds divided by market capitalization) minus the pre-committed share of the issue. Payout is the average dividend payout ratio over the last three 
years prior to issue. Wealth transfer is the wealth transfer to bondholders as a result of the equity issue, as calculated the appendix. Distress equals 1 when a company is in the 
lowest ROA decile or in the highest leverage decile or has an interest cover below two. Discount is the discount of issue price to theoretical ex-rights price. Rights is a dummy 
variable indicating whether a rights issue is chosen (=1). T-values are between brackets. 
***,
**,
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
  Ownership  Proceeds  Wealth transfer  Growth  All   Expected  
  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2a  Model 2b  Model 3a  Model 3b  Model 4  Model 5a  Model 5b  sign 
Intercept  -0.006  -0.031
***  -0.049
**  -0.072
***  -0.046  0.028  0.012  -0.076  -0.014   
  (-0.192)  (-2.789)  (-2.077)  (-2.834)  (-1.574)  (1.681)  (0.437)  (-1.478)  (0.277)   
Total ownership concentration  0.307              0.093    ( + ) 
  (1.570)              (0.428)     
Total ownership concentration
2  -0.814
**              -0.495    ( - ) 
  (-2.222)              (-1.376)     
Directors’ ownership concentration                  -0.089  ( - ) 
                  (-1.426)   
Changes in directors’ ownership concentration  -0.001
**  -0.001
*      -0.001
**      -0.000    ( ? ) 
  (-2.054)  (-1.799)      (-2.405)      (-1.606)     
Institutional ownership concentration  -0.238              -0.195  -0.111
*  ( + ) 
  (-1.586)              (-1.455)  (-1.910)   
Institutional ownership concentration
2  0.352              0.295    ( - ) 
  (1.619)              (1.491)     
Corporate and individual ownership                  -0.193
***  ( + ) 
                  (-2.956)   
Level of total ownership concentration * Changes  -0.184
*                ( - ) 
    (-1.868)                 
Level of directors’ ownership concentration * Changes                -0.001  ( + ) 
                  (-1.583)   
Level of institutional ownership concentration * Changes  -0.009              -0.002  ( - ) 
    (-0.356)              (-1.296)   
Level of corporate and individual ownership * Changes               -0.022
***   ( - ) 
                  (-4.436)   
Proceeds for acquisition      0.044
*  0.068
***  0.032      0.042
*  0.046
***  ( + ) 
      (1.720)  (2.742)  (1.597)      (1.692)  (2.741)   
Proceeds for debt reduction      0.060
**  0.079
***  0.031      0.056
*  0.055
**  ( - ) 
      (2.261)  (2.990)  (1.563)      (1.934)  (2.629)   
Distress        0.019  -0.029
**        -0.048




        (0.791)  (-2.003)        (-3.582)   
Distress * Proceeds for acquisition    -0.035          -0.029    ( - ) 
      (-1.506)          (-1.261)     
Distress * Proceeds for debt reduction    -0.028          -0.050
*    ( ? ) 
      (-1.128)          (-1.934)     
Distress * Rights* Proceeds for acquisition    -0.088
***            ( - ) 
        (-3.101)             
Distress * Rights * Proceeds for debt reduction    -0.036            ( ? ) 
        (-1.197)             
Relative issue size                0.001  0.001  ( ? ) 
                (1.250)  (1.190)   
Issue size          0.007    0.014
**  0.017
**  0.013
**  ( ? ) 
          (1.212)    (2.211)  (2.222)  (1.967)   
Issue size * Distress            -0.014
*      ( ? ) 
              (-1.756)       
Payout                -0.000  0.000  ( + ) 
                (-1.590)  (-0.497)   
Book-to-market              -0.066
**  -0.021  -0.023  ( - ) 
              (-2.452)  (-0.896)  (-1.054)   
Book-to-market * Distress            0.035      ( - ) 
              (0.968)       
Relative ROA          -0.026
***        ( - ) 
            (-3.378)         
Relative ROA* Distress          0.041
***        ( + ) 
            (3.576)         
Lead underwriter=major (yes=1)                0.031  -0.011  ( + ) 
                (1.394)  -0.542   
Wealth transfer          0.035
**  0.053
**  0.019  -0.001  0.038
**  ( - ) 
          (2.021)  (2.269)  (0.750)  (-0.074)  (2.518)   
Wealth transfer * Distress          -0.025  0.018      ( - ) 
            (-0.838)  (0.466)       
Rights                0.012  -0.018  ( - ) 
                (0.325)  (-0.885)   
Discount          -0.004
***  -0.005
***  -0.005
***  -0.001  -0.005
***  ( - ) 
          (-3.562)  (-3.404)  (-3.163)  (-0.222)  (-3.616)   
Discount * Rights          0.001  0.002  -0.004    ( - ) 
            (0.449)  (0.908)  (-0.633)     
Adjusted R
2  0.144  0.097  0.060  0.189  0.345  0.359  0.411  0.429  0.624   
F  2.713
**  2.835






***   
 